

~~SECRET~~

Noted
JSE

26 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General: 1965 Inspector General's Survey of NPIC
Specific: Recent Developments through 26 July 1965

1. I met with the Inspector General at 0835 hours, 26 July 1965. He informed me of developments during my absence on leave last week:

a. Paul Borel forwarded a memorandum to the Executive Director urging action with respect to the NPIC problem. There were several attachments including a memorandum from [] to the DD/I, recommending the recruitment of up to [] more people immediately. Borel's memorandum suggested that funds could be found by transferring from the collectors that have them to the exploiters that need them.

b. The Executive Director called a meeting last week and invited the Inspector General to participate. Mr. Earman declined. One of the outcomes of the meeting was that NPIC was given the go-ahead to launch an all-out recruitment effort to build its staff to current authorized strength. The Executive Director mentioned to the Inspector General he was surprised to hear that NPIC needed so few PI's and so many support types. Mr. Earman told the Executive Director that this came as no surprise to him.

c. [] Executive Director, NPIC, came to see the Inspector General at 1020 hours, Friday, 23 July. Their meeting lasted nearly 1½ hours. Mr. Earman said he had found it very difficult to understand what [] was driving at. [] concern was with recommendations 16 and 17 on page 109 of our report. No. 16 recommended a formal T/O for PAG and that responsibility for personnel administration of CIA employees assigned to PAG be transferred from C/PID to the senior CIA officer in PAG. No. 17 recommended that CIA fulfill its commitment for PI's to PAG. [] said that these two recommendations were causing him much trouble. [] wanted to clear his responses to all of the Inspector General's recommendations with the Inspector General. Mr. Earman replied

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

25X1 that the NPIC responses would actually be from the DD/I to
25X1 the DDCI, and indicated that he did not want to involve him-
25X1 self in negotiations on draft responses. Mr. Earman did
agree to have [] discuss our thinking on recommendations
16 and 17 with [] if [] wished. The Inspector General
directed me to call [] and volunteer to meet with him.

25X1 2. I called [] at 1130 hours 26 July and offered to discuss
these recommendations with him. We talked on the phone for about ten
minutes and I, too, was unable to fathom precisely what was bothering
25X1 [] I suspect his concern is with the political implications of
surrendering control of photo interpreters to a level in the chain of
25X1 command where the Director, NPIC, does not exercise full administrative
control. [] complained that the Inspection team had not discussed
the matter of rotation with him. This is true. We did not discuss the
mechanics of rotation with him in detail, although not because we did
not try. When we raised this point with [] and with []
25X1 Chief, PID, we hit dead end on their arguments that control of the Center
rested on control of photo interpreters. [] declined my offer to dis-
cuss rotation with him. He said he had had trouble in coming to grips
with these two recommendations, but that he thought he now had the NPIC
responses worked out in his mind, and would soon have the responses
ready to go forward in writing.

25X1 3. Before calling [] I had a brief conversation with John Vance
25X1 to make sure that our thinking on this point was consistent. John men-
25X1 tioned, as an aside, that [] had accepted NPIC's invitation to
return for further discussions on systems improvement. It was Vance's
understanding that [] is at NPIC right now.

25X1

SECRET